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Abstract—Two-hop security communication with an 
eavesdropper in wireless environment is a hot research direction. 
The basic idea is that the destination, simultaneously with the 
source, sends a jamming signal to interfere the eavesdropper 
near to or co-located with the relay. Similar as physical layer 
network coding, the friendly jamming signal will prevent the 
eavesdropper from detecting the useful information originated 
from the source and will not affect the destination on detecting 
the source information with the presence of the known jamming 
signal. However, existing investigations are confined to Gaussian 
distributed signals, which are seldom used in real systems. When 
finite constellation signals are applied, the behavior of the secrecy 
rate becomes very different. For example, the secrecy rate 
depends on phase difference between the input signals with finite 
constellations, which is not observed with Gaussian signals. In 
this paper, we investigate the secrecy capacity and derive its 
upper bound for the two-hop relay model, by assuming an 
eavesdropper near the relay and the widely used M-PSK 
modulation. With our upper bound, the best and worst phase 
differences in high SNR region are then given. Numerical studies 
verify our analysis and show that the derived upper bound is 
relatively tight.  
  
Keywords—M-PSK; finite constellations; capacity; secrecy rate; 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, 
signal transmission in wireless environment is faced with a 
variety of security threats (e.g. interference, eavesdroppers, 
malicious node, untrusted relay, etc). Therefore, secrecy plays 
an important role in wireless networks and draws a lot of 
research attentions. Wyner investigated the wiretap channel [1] 
and showed that secure communication is possible in spite of 
the existence of an unauthorized intruder, under the condition 
that it can only observe degraded signals. For the general 
Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel (GGMAC-WT) and 
the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel (GTW-WT), a 
corresponding secrecy measure is defined, and achievable 
secrecy rate regions are determined in [2]. A secure two-hop 
communication model with an untrusted relay is considered in 
[3-6]. In these works, the untrusted relay was confused by a 
friendly jamming signal to prevent the relay from decoding 
useful information originated from the source, where the 
jamming signal could be sent by the destination or an external 
friendly node. This idea is the same as the security mechanism 
of physical layer network coding [7-8]. 
We find that all the papers above were studied under the 
assumption of Gaussian distributed signal, including both the 
jamming and data signals. However, Gaussian distributed 
signals are rather theoretical and are seldom used in practical 
systems. More important, there is quite a little difference when 
practical finite constellations signals are adopted, especially 
taking the phase difference between the input signals into 
consideration. This scenario has only been noted in the area of 
Gaussian interference channel (GIC) and Gaussian multiple 
access channel. In [9], the two-user GIC with finite 
constellation-based transmitted signal is studied, and it is 
verified that if one user rotates its constellation appropriately 
with respect to the constellation of the other user, the 
achievable sum-rate in the network increases considerably. In 
[10], Constellation Constrained (CC) capacity region of two-
user Single-Input Single-Output (SISO) Gaussian Multiple 
Access Channel are investigated under two schemes (non-
orthogonal MA and orthogonal MA). To guarantee unique 
decodability property, appropriate rotation between the input 
constellations (such as M-PSK, M-QAM) is employed by the 
NO-MA scheme, with the objective of maximally enlarging 
the CC capacity. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
work that discusses the finite constellation’s effect on secure 
transmission. 
In this paper, we adopt the two-hop relay channel model as 
shown in Fig. 1. We assume that there is an eavesdropper near 
the relay, which can overhear the transmissions from both the 
source and the relay. If we do not protect the transmitted 
signals, the eavesdropper has a high chance to recover the 
information when the signal strengths are high enough to 
guarantee correct detection at the destination. To keep the 
information secret from the eavesdropper
1
, one effective way 
is to send an artificial interference from the destination to 
jamming the eavesdropper when the source is transmitting to 
the relay. This model is similar to the scenario where the relay 
node is untrusted [3-6], and the relay together with the 
eavesdropper co-located in the same entity.  
Different from existing friendly interference works, which 
only consider Gaussian signal and jamming signal, we 
investigate secure transmissions where both the source and the 
 
1 Note that the cryptograph schemes are not considered here since it 
has the probability to be deciphered in theory. 
destination only explore the widely used PSK modulations. 
This practical constellations assumption is not only reasonable 
in real wireless system, but also makes sense in theory. As a 
result, the secrecy rate is affected by the phase difference 
between the source and the destination, and this fact is not 
observed with Gaussian distributed signals.  
To derive the upper bound for secrecy rate, we apply the 
rate equivocation inequality in [11] and the information theory 
formulation. Due to PSK signals, when the phase difference is 
changed, the upper bound will be different. Since there is no 
closed-form expression for the upper bound of secrecy rate 
with varying phase difference, we only perform numerical 
study to reflect the change.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II, 
we present the system model; in section III, we derive the 
secrecy rate using information theory technique; in section IV, 
we derive an upper bound of the secrecy rate, and, we show 
the simulation results and conclusion in the last two sections, 
respectively.  
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
Refer to Figure 1, S denotes the source, R denotes the relay, 
D denotes the destination, and E denotes the eavesdropper, 
which is adjacent to the relay. Solid lines represent the 
multiple-access (MA) phase, and dashed lines represent the 
broadcast (BC) phase. PSK-modulated signals 
sX  and dX  
denote the signals from the source and the destination 
respectively, where
sX  contains confidential message, and 
dX  is the jamming signal from the destination to the relay at 
the same time with 
sX . We consider the scenario where the 
information originated from the source is not encrypted. 
Hence, we need a jamming signal to protect it from 
eavesdropping. 
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Fig.1.  A two-hop wiretap channel 
We assume that there are n signals transmitted during the 
MA phase, and m signals transmitted during the BC phase. We 
assume that the relay adopts amplify-and-forward (AF) 
scheme. We hence have n m , and we use W to represent the 
confidential message contained in sX .  
Because of PSK signals, we can let the constellation of 
signal adopt the M-PSK scheme. The source packet n
sX  
includes n symbols 1 2, ns s sx x x , with each symbol composed as 
1
i
s sx P x , where 1P  represents the power of the source, and 
sx  is a M-PSK modulated signal that follows the uniform 
distribution in set 
2
: 0 1
jm
MX m Me
 
   
 
. The interference 
packet n
dX  is defined similarly: 
 2
i j
d dx e P x
  
where 
2P  denotes the power of the destination and   denotes 
the phase difference between the source and destination. 
All the signals are transmitted in Gaussian channel. The 
length-n vector signal received by the relay in the MA phase, 
denoted by 
1
nY , is formulated as: 

1 1
n n n n
s dY X X N    
where the noise vector 
1
nN  is a zero mean Gaussian random 
variable with unit variance. 
At the same time, the signal that the eavesdropper received 
in the MA phase is denoted by n
eY  and is formulated as: 

2
n n n n
e s dY X X N    
where the noise vector 
2
nN  is also a zero mean Gaussian 
random variable with unit variance. Hereafter, we ignore the 
superscript n, since the length of all vector signals is fixed.  
In the BC phase, the relay broadcasts signal 
1 'Y , which is 
computed from 
1 'Y . We assume the relay adopts AF. So, we 
can get: 

1 1' ( )s dY X X N    
where the amplification factor   is a constant number either 
larger than 1 or smaller than 1, determined by the power 
constraint of the relay. 
The signal received by the destination in the BC phase is 
denoted by 
2Y , given by:   

2 1 3'Y Y N   
where 
3N  is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit 
variance. 
Correspondingly, let 'eY  denote the signal received by the 
eavesdropper during the BC phase, which is given by: 

1 4' 'eY Y N   
where 
4N  is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit 
variance.  
From (2), (3), and (5), we know that the eavesdropper 
receives two copies that carry the information. It can combine 
these two copies using the optimal maximal ratio combining 
(MRC).  The final expression for the signal obtained by the 
eavesdropper is hence:  

1 4 2
2
( ) ( 1)
1
e s d
s d e
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1
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 denotes a mixed 
Gaussian noise, with zero mean and variance 
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. 
At the destination, the self-interference can be total 
removed from 
2Y  and the final signal can be expressed by: 
 3
1d s
N
Y X N

    
III. SECRECY RATE 
The eavesdropper will make full use of what it received to 
gain the confidential message. Hence the secrecy constraint 
can be denoted as: 

1 1
lim ( ) lim ( | , '  )e e
n m n m
H W H W Y Y
n m n m   

 
 
It means that the eavesdropper could obtain some information 
about 
sX  containing the confidential message W, nonethless, 
it can’t get any useful information about W. 
With satisfying of (9), the secrecy rate 
eR can be defined 
as: 

1
lim ( )e
n m
R H W
n m 


 
Due to the optimality of the MRC in (7), we can get: 

1 1
lim ( ) lim ( | )e e
n m n m
R H W H W Y
n m n m   
 
 
 
In Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) wiretap 
channel, the secrecy capacity equals to the difference between 
the main and overall eavesdropper channel capacities [11]. 
From Shannon Theory, the achievable secrecy rate region is 
given as: 

p( )
max[ ( ; ) ( ; )]e s d s e
x
R I X Y I X Y   
where the right hand side of inequality (12) is wire-tap channel 
capacity according to [11], and it is maximized when p(x) is 
Gaussian distribution
2
. In this system, for M-PSK modulation, 
each symbol is chosen with equal probability from the M 
constellations and p(x) is fixed. By spreading the right hand 
side of (12), we get: 

 ( ; ) ( ; )
    ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
e s d s e
s s d e e s
R I X Y I X Y
h X h X Y h Y h Y X
 
   
 
Since   is the phase difference between sX  and dX , only 
( )eh Y  is correlated with   in (13). To maximize the channel 
capacity, we should try our best to reduce ( )eh Y  or ( ; )s eI X Y , 
which can be achieved by adjusting the phase difference 
between the source and the destination. 
IV. UPPER BOUND 
We assume the eavesdropper uses the Maximum-
Likelihood (ML) detection method to get the transmitted 
symbol 
sX  from eY . In the following, we develop a lower 
bound on ( ; )s eI X Y . Firstly, let 

|
arg max ( | )
e s
s
s eY Xx X
X p Y x

 
We use Pr( )e s sp X X   to denote the symbol error 
probability with the ML estimation in (14). Then, we have 

( )
( )
( )
( ; ) ( ; ) ( ) ( | )
             log ( | )
             log ( ) log( 1)
                  
a
s e s e s s e
b
s e
c
e e
I X Y I X Y H X H X Y
M H X Y
M H p p M
  
 
   
 
 
2 When the right hand side of  (12) is negative, the secrecy rate is 
zero, and this extreme case is not considered in this paper.  
where step (a) follows from the data processing inequality [12], 
and (b) is due to M-PSK constellations modulation, step  (c) 
follows from Fano’s inequality, and 
( ) log( ) (1 )log(1 )e e e e eH p p p p p      is a binary entropy. 
Therefore, we could obtain an upper bound as follows: 
( ; ) ( ; )
    ( ; ) log ( ) log( 1)
    ( ) ( | ) log ( ) log( 1)
    log ( | ) log ( ) log( 1)
    ( ) log( 1) ( | )
e s d s e
s d e e
s s d e e
s d e e
e e s d
R I X Y I X Y
I X Y M H p p M
H X H X Y M H p p M
M H X Y M H p p M
H p p M H X Y
 
    
     
     
   
 
Note that 
ep , which is the symbol error rate for the 
eavesdropper inferring the confidential information, depends 
on the phase difference  . The third term in (16), ( | )s dH X Y , 
does not depends on  , and approaches to zero only if the 
destination decodes 
sX  correctly. The first two terms of 
formula (16) are both correlated to
ep , and they serve a looser 
upper bound on the secrecy rate.   
Our objective is to make 
ep  as large as possible by 
changing  , so as to make the eavesdropper can’t wiretap any 
useful information. Note that what he eavesdropper got is just 
the superposition of 
sX , dX , and Gaussian mixture noise eN . 
Along with the angle changing, the virtual constellation of 
s dX X  varies, so the minimum distance of the constellation, 
defined by 
mind , also changes, which will have effect on ep . 
In high SNR region, it is widely known that the symbol error 
rate would become larger when the minimum distance 
becomes smaller, and vice versa. The highest and the lowest 
ep  on   can be respectively defined as: 
 min=arg minh d

  
and 
 min=arg maxl d

  
By directly computing 
min ( )d  , we could obtain h  and l  
easily. For example, 0h   and / 6 or / 3l    when 
QPSK used at both source and destinations. At the same time, 
there is no doubt that it is more convenient for us to analyze 
ep  and the upper bound. Then, we have the following 
conclusions: 
Proposition: In high SNR region, the secrecy rate 
eR is 
maximized when 
h   and minimized when l  .  
A sketch of the proof is as follows. When SNR increase, 
the equality in Fano’s inequality can be achieved and 
( ) log( 1)e eH p p M   is an increasing function of ep , which 
is a decreasing function of 
mind . The detailed proof is omitted 
due to limited space. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we perform some numerical simulation 
results. We assume the signals of the source and the 
destination is QPSK modulated with the same power 
P1=P2=P.  
Firstly, the minimum distance 
mind  and symbol error rate 
ep  is shown in Fig.2. It is easy to see that the curve of symbol 
error rate 
ep  is an inversion of minimum distance mind . h  is 
equal to 0 , and 
l  is equal to / 6, / 3  , with a circle of 
/ 2  for QPSK. With higher SNRs, this phenomenon is more 
obvious.  
Fig.3 and Fig.4 shows the secrecy capacity and the upper 
bound with different phase differences and SNRs. With 
reference to Fig. 2, it is verified that the upper bound linearly 
increases with 
ep . Furthermore, the upper bound becomes 
tighter when the power increases as shown in Fig.3 and Fig.4.  
The behavior of the simulated secrecy rates are little 
different in Fig.3 and Fig. 4. When the SNR is 5 dB, the 
minimum rate is achieved at / 4   and the maximum rate 
is achieved at 0  . Since in low SNR, the conclusion in our 
Proposition does not hold any more. In this case, it is more 
accurate to upper bound 
eR by regarding s dX X N  as a 
Gaussian distribution. When / 4  , it is like Gaussian 
variable most and when 0  , it is like Gaussian variable 
least.  
When SNR increases to 10 dB, the curve of 
eR  is almost 
the same as the upper bound and the conclusion in our 
Proposition holds.  
As the SNR further increases as in Fig. 4, the distance 
between any two constellation points of 
s dX X  is big 
enough for most phase differences. In other words, the 
eavesdropper can detect the information ( , )s dX X  from eY  
easier and ( )eh Y   becomes larger. However, ( )eh Y  is limited 
by: 

( ) ( )
        ( ) h( ) 4 h( )
e s d e
s d e e
h Y h X X N
H X X N N
  
    
      
which does not depend on the phase difference any more. This 
explains why the secrecy rate in Fig. 4 becomes flat. 
Another interesting observation from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 is 
that the power affects the secrecy rate in a non-monotonic way, 
which is different from the traditional point-to-point 
transmission. The secrecy rate is first increased when SNR 
changes from 5 dB to 10 dB as in Fig. 3 and it then decreased 
when SNR changes to 20 dB in Fig. 4. So, we need carefully 
design the transmission power to maximize the secrecy rate in 
our system.  
 
Fig.2. Plots of symbol error rate 
ep  and minimum distance mind  with the 
phase difference  . 
 
Fig.3. The secrecy rate and upper bound with the phase difference  . 
 
Fig.4. The secrecy rate and upper bound with phase difference  . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A two-hop secure Gaussian channel was studied based on 
finite constellations. It was found that when the different 
phase between the two users’ (source node and destination 
node) constellations applied, the secrecy capacity varies. We 
gave the best and worst phase differences in an analytical way 
in high SNR region by deriving an upper bound.  Numerical 
simulations not only verified our analysis but also showed the 
effect of SNR on secrecy rate. With the result in our paper, we 
can carefully design the transmission power and phase 
difference to maximize the system secrecy rate. 
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